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Abstract 
European Integration was constructed as a primarily economic project. In its formative phase 
ordoliberal scholars started to promote the understanding of the ensemble of European economic 
freedoms togther with a system of undistorted competition as the legal framework and normative core 
of the EEC, i.e. as Europe’s ‘economic’ constitution. Economic and Monetary Union as 
institutionalized by the Maastricht Treaty were expected to complete this project. However, the whole 
edifice started to erode immediately after its establishment. Following the financial and the sovereign 
debt crises, EMU with its commitments to price stability and its focus on monetary politics is by now 
widely perceived as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. The 
European crisis management seeks to compensate these failures by regime which disregards the 
European order of competences, des-empowers national institutions and burdens in particular Southern 
Europe with austerity measures. This new mode of economic governance establishes pan-European 
commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balancing. The ideal of an ordering of the 
European economy ‘through law’ is thereby abolished while the economic and social prospects of 
these efforts seem gloomy and the Union’s political legitimacy is eroding. 
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LAW AND POLITICS IN EUROPE’S CRISIS: 
ON THE HISTORY OF THE IMPACT OF AN UNFORTUNATE CONFIGURATION 
Christian Joerges
*
 
 
‘Ich möchte Deutschland und den Deutschen für Ihren großen Einsatz für unser Europa von Herzen 
danken.
1
 Along the European integration history, Germany has been the biggest contributor in 
financial terms towards our project. That is why I never miss an opportunity to say thank you. Yet, 
let’s be completely frank, there is a paradox. The perception of the outside world is not always in tune 
with this… In politics, the issue is sometimes not what we do but how we do it. It is about explaining 
and communicating what we truly believe to be in the best interest of our citizens.’ Jose Barroso 
closed his remarks on ‘The State of Europe’ with these words in front of a very large invitation-only 
audience on 9 November 2011 at the Haus der Berliner Festspiele.
2 
Indeed: there is no sign of 
enthusiasm in Germany. But this is not what vexes the European public. On the contrary, the 
perception is, and with quite a bit of resentment, that Berlin decides what is to be done in the crisis 
countries. The paradox of which Barroso speaks does not exist. Instead, this is a clearly delineated 
constellation of conflict: the enforcement of European prerogatives driven by allegedly irresistible 
economic constraints versus the rights to political autonomy on the part of states and of their citizens’ 
trust in constitutional commitments to the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and democracy. Nobody 
can desire and design such a disastrous situation. But it cannot be controlled easily, either.  
Integration through Law 
Europe is substantially a ‘Community of law’. This characterisation is widely ascribed to the first 
President of the Commission of the EEC.
3
 And indeed, from the outset, much was entrusted to law. 
The law was considered capable of governing a broad range of issues. It was to overcome the natural 
state of the European world of states, replace its bellicose past with a peacetime order, and rein in 
economic egoism used by Member States. ‘Integration through law’ was the motto of European policy 
in its formative phase, which was dominated by jurists. The so-called constitutionalisation of the 
treaties, which created an autonomous order distinctly separate both from the law of the nation-states 
and from international law, emerged through the European Court of Justice and consisted of legal 
principles: Community law binds the Member States; core components not requiring implementation 
apply directly as the ‘law of the land’; therefore, their effect must take precedence over national law; 
they must bring about unity and be applied uniformly; that is why a central authority is necessary to 
define this unity; the European Court of Justice itself is the only suitable option for this function. Of 
course, on the path from the Economic Community of 1957 to the ‘ever closer union of the peoples of 
Europe’, Europe unceasingly remade what Hans Peter Ipsen has characterised as a Wandelverfassung4 
                                                     
* 
Translated from the German by Sandra H. Lustig, Hamburg. The German version was published in (2012) 66 Merkur. 
Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, Heft  762, 1013-1024. 
1
 [I would like to thank Germany and the Germans sincerely for your great dedication for our Europe]. In German in the 
official version at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-738_en.htm. 
2
 ‘The State of Europe – Die Europa Rede Berlin, 9 November 2011’; note 1. 
3
 The pertinent publication was in French: Walter Hallstein, ‘La Communauté Européenne, nouvel ordre juridique. (1964) 
Les Documents Communauté Européenne, no 27; see Matev Abelj, ‘The Legal Viability of European Integration in the 
Absence of Constitutional Hierarchy’, in Daniel Augenstein (ed), ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The Making of the 
European Polity, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012, 29.46. 
4
 See his ‘Europäische Verfassung – Nationale Verfassung’, (1987) Europarecht, 195-213, at 201. 
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and it engaged continuously in constitutional reconfigurations. Yet those dogmatic core concepts on 
which Europe was founded in legal terms remained in force. Their stability and impact seem simply 
phenomenal. But this appearance is also deceptive. The shadow of orthodoxy in terms of European 
legal policy concealed both their inherent partiality and their political powerlessness. 
Processes of Erosion: A Digression into Karl Polanyi’s Economic Sociology  
In his remarks on ‘The State of Europe’, Barroso focussed on the crisis of Economic and Monetary 
Union and thus on an institutional accomplishment, which was originally perceived as the the 
consummation of very high ambitions – entirely line with the original project of ‘integration through 
law’. The monetary union agreed in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 was a political project, but one 
that was constituted again as a legal project: The new common currency was hence not to be entrusted 
to a political union, but to be bound to legal rules. Only an economic policy ‘that could be bound by 
constitutional law aligned with actionable criteria’ was to be practiced in Europe – that was the creed 
of Ordoliberalism.
5
 The legal constitution of monetary policy fulfilled this demand and took on a form 
that was to immunise Europe against Keynesian impulses and macroeconomic policies, a form that 
was to determine priorities in each given situation, and that therefore could not be legally programmed 
according to actionable criteria which the judiciary would supervise. As is well known today, this 
strategy was not successful. Yet the inherent defects and design flaws of the monetary union and the 
1997 Stability Pact rounding it out were already widely known at the time. It was not long before they 
became generally visible. The fact that it was precisely Germany and France that did not follow the 
rules laid down in the Stability Pact and that the deficit procedures initiated by the Commission then 
came to nothing led to the German apologists of the € incriminating themselves and calling for its 
legal framework to be perfected. These complaints take the wrong approach. ‘The 3% cap is at best 
ridiculous and at worst perverse’, wrote Barry Eichengreen, one of the most renowned observers of 
European monetary policy, in the 20 November 2003 issue of DIE ZEIT. He knew that at the time, 
Germany could not afford the Stability Pact and would therefore not comply with it. The project of 
‘integration through law’, expanded to include the monetary constitution, had gained a Pyrrhic victory 
in the Maastricht Treaty and a decade later met defeat at Cannae.  
‘“More Europe” is by definition better.’ – ‘In the final analysis, crises always promoted integration.’ 
These theorems, which have been repeated so often, are no longer on firm ground. Taking a look at the 
economic sociology of Austro-Hungarian emigré Karl Polanyi, which has experienced a renaissance in 
recent years, is helpful. His arguments seem to call many certitudes of European Studies in question.
6
 
Three ‘fictitious goods’ play a prominent role in Polanyi’s reconstruction of how industrial capitalism 
prevailed and its susceptibility to crises: money, labour, and land. According to Polanyi, they are 
fictitious if and because they are treated like goods even though they were not produced for the 
market. Success does not come easily to such imposed commodification; instead, such political moves 
will spark crises and provoke countermovements. These theorems are astonishingly current. We have 
already started to discuss ‘money’ and will focus on that commodity. But it is worth noting that 
Polanyi’s warning deserves to be taken seriously more comprehensively. With regard to ‘labour’, this 
is obvious and particularly urgent. Headed by its highest court, Europe is waving the flag of economic 
                                                     
5
 See for a seminal restatement of this tradition Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘Macht – Recht – Wirtschaftsverfassung’, (1972) 
137 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, 97-118; Mestmäcker’s most recent worried 
interventions mirror his commitments to this tradition; see ‘Der Schamfleck ist die Geldverachtung`(the ashaming flaw is 
the disdainfulness of money), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.11.2011, p. 33 and ‘Ordnungspolitische Grundlagen 
einer politischen Union’ (foundational principles for the ordering of a political union), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
12.11.2012, p. 12.  
6
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart (1944); references here are to the to the 2001 
edition published by Beacon Press in Boston. On its topicality in place of many other works: Fred Block, ‘Karl Polanyi 
and the writing of The Great Transformation’, (2003) 33 Theory and Society, 275-306 and  Jens Beckert, ‘Die soziale 
Ordnung von Märkten’, MPIfG Cologne, Discussion Paper 07/6. Cologne 2007. 
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freedoms of Europe’s market citizens and retreats from collective labour law – once the 
institutionalized countermovement to the commodification of labour.
7
 It is quite remarkable that this 
move occurred in an unheard of vigour in December 2007, that is together with the beginning of the 
financial crisis.
8 
After its turn towards a community of austerity, Europe is now riding roughshod over 
considerations of labour and social law. Environmental policy is about ‘land’ in the sense of our 
natural resources – actually a flagship in the process of integration. Admittedly, one very sensitive 
environmental issue, namely the conflict about nuclear energy, does not fit this pattern – and again, the 
law plays an unfortunate role. Although the Euratom Treaty of 1957 praised atomic energy as the 
technology of the future par excellence, the decision about using it was left to the Member States. The 
Treaty of Lisbon did not change this in any way – with the consequence that a phase-out of atomic 
energy in Europe effective for everybody involved can take place only if all Member States were to 
implement it. Germany has yet to feel the effects of the de facto irreversibility of this legal situation. 
For the time being, however, Europe is preoccupied with its currency and the financial crisis. 
De-Juridification of Monetary Union 
One would like to know, but one cannot know what ‘in actual fact’ is the case here. The German 
Council of Economic Experts, which still exists even after the de facto repeal of the Keynesian 1967 
Stability Act, diagnoses ‘multiple crises’ in its special report of 5 July 2012.9 According to the report, 
the ‘banking, debt and macroeconomic crises’ are interrelated in a ‘mutually reinforcing’ ‘vicious 
circle’. The European economic and monetary union can quite obviously not cope with all this. Since 
the spring of 2010, Europe has been taking action rapidly, and by now at breakneck speed, introducing 
audacious regulatory mechanisms: the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ (March 2010), the ‘European Semester’ 
(May 2010), the ‘EFSF Framework Agreement’ (June 2010), the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (March 2011), and 
the ‘Six Pack’ (December 2011). And much more is ready to complement these steps or in the 
pipeline: the ‘Two Pack’ (November 2011), the ‘European Stability Mechanism’ (February 2012), the 
‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance’ (TSCG, March 2012), and the banking union 
(September 2012). Since all this is difficult to reconcile with the Treaties, in particular with the bailout 
ban of Article 125 TFEU, an audacious revision procedure in accordance with Article 48 Paragraph 6 
TEU foresees amending Article 136 TFEU with a new Paragraph 3 legalising financial assistance as of 
1 January 2013.  
From a legal point of view, there is quite a lot here which can and needs to be discussed, and not 
surprisingly, the debates on the extent to which the legal scope can be widened, preferably without 
Treaty amendments, are highly intense. The deeper threat, however, does not stem from this or that 
acrobatic feat of interpretation, but from the fact that legally structured action is replaced by bundles 
of measures that are characterised by a given situation and take effect in particular concerning 
‘multilateral surveillance’. A transnational functional bureaucracy is being established here whose 
forms of action are oriented towards the models of independent agencies in which there are no 
genuinely European competencies. To be sure, all constitutional democracies are familiar with the 
delegation of decision-making powers to institutions that possess particular expert knowledge, develop 
long-term orientations, and are to be protected from the rhythms and vicissitudes of politics. But such 
delegations are usually limited to well-defined fields and are monitored through control mechanisms 
of their own. Giandomenico Majone, the staunchest proponent of European governance through 
independent agencies, has always argued for reserving all distributive policies for the nation-states 
                                                     
7
 See the recent Commission report on labour market developments at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-5_en.pdf.  
8
 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking 
Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, [2007] 
ECR I-11767; Case C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, [2008 ]ECR I-01989. 
9
 http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de. 
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because only they can be democratically legitimated to a sufficient degree. This is not possible, he 
claims, with the type of macroeconomic management now practiced in European crisis management, 
and which is to be perpetuated institutionally. This would establish a European distribution machinery 
that could only change the European democratic deficit into ‘democratic default’.10  
Constitution without a Guardian 
The current crisis policy avoids regular treaty revision procedures that appear risky in substance, but 
that are also unsuitable because they take too much time and moreover could require referenda. Their 
supervision by the judiciary seems all the more important. Yet one must also consider the following: It 
is according to Article 263 TFEU the European Court of Justice who has the mandate to assess the 
legality of European legislative acts, the actions of the Council, the Commission, and the European 
Central Bank. How likely is it, however, that institutions with the right to initiate proceedings – the 
Member States, the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission – will take action against 
measures in which they are so deeply involved, and regarding which they risk to receive a decision 
rejecting their claims? Even more important in systematic terms: How far and how deeply would a 
ruling by the ECJ penetrate the structure of European, nation-state, and international-law policy? 
Small wonder, that so far
11
 national constitutional courts, above all the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC), were the most important fora for debating crisis policy.  
With its new rulings on the relationship between the Basic Law and European law, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court has become nothing less than a target of European constitutionalism, 
even if for entirely different reasons. Just 20 years ago, the decision of the FCC on the Maastricht 
Treaty had drawn a great deal of attention. With this judgment, the Court made a considerable, albeit 
highly problematic, contribution to the development of the economic and monetary union. The FCC 
has stated that a de-politicised legal architecture of the monetary union was a sine qua non for 
Germany to participate.
12
 The Court must have recognised how fragile the institutional configuration 
of the monetary union was to which it had given its consent. This, of all things, was not deemed 
worthy of mention in the public-law division of European law scholarship in Germany or elsewhere.
13
  
The judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon then emphasised new points without explicitly calling the 
Maastricht precedent into question. On the one hand, it stipulated that there is a ‘responsibility for 
integration’ founded in constitutional law, on the other, it also underlined its mandate to protect 
Germany’s democratic statehood. We can read, for example: ‘The state is neither a myth nor an end in 
itself, but a historically developed, globally recognised organisational form of a political community 
                                                     
10
 Cf., Giandomenico Majone, ‘Rethinking European Integration after the Debt Crisis’, UCL Working Paper 3/2012. London 
2012. 
11
 By now, however, the CJEU has followed suit in Case C-370/12 Pringle v Ireland, Judgment of 27 November 2012 – and 
the similarities in the reasoning of both courts are remarkable; see Michelle Everson /Christian Joerges, ‘Who is the 
Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe after the Financial Crisis?’, forthcoming in Sandra Kröger (ed.), 
Political Representation in the European Union: Still democratic in times of crisis?, London: Routledge; 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2287111. 
12
 Judgment of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155 [Brunner v. European Union Treaty, (1994) 57 Common Market Law 
Reports, 1].  
13
 Instead, the Court was confronted with its talk of an ‘association of states’, its announcement that it would refuse to follow 
‘diverging legal acts’, but above all the statement that it was a dictate of democracy that a ‘relatively homogeneous 
people’ must have the opportunity ‘to give legal expression to what unifies them – intellectually, socially, and 
politically’; cf., famously, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos. Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision’, (1996) 1 European Law Journal, 219-258; but see also Christian Joerges in all his works 
on Europe since ‘The Market without a State? [1992] States without Markets? [1996] Two Essays on the Law of the 
European Economy’, EUI Working Paper Law 1/96, San Domenico di Fiesole 1996, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019 
and -020.htm. 
Law and Politics in Europe’s Crisis 
5 
able to take action.’ Responsibility for integration and responsibility for democracy are two different 
things. One should not pursue one objective at the expense of the other, but rather respond to this 
tension with conflict rules that shape the process of integration in a democracy-friendly way. Surely 
the judgement failed to explore that insight in more depth and contained less comforting passages. But 
the outrage it provoked is hardly justified.
14
  
And then, the less spectacular decision of 19 June 2012, in which the Court defended the right of the 
Bundestag to be informed, nurtured new hopes.
15
 The strengthening of the Bundestag was not 
presented as a conflict rule mitigating between democratic commitments and integration objectives. 
But the judgment documents very precisely how crisis management is taking place, namely in the 
post-democratic regulatory mode that Damian Chalmers and Giandomenico Majone were talking 
about.
16
 In a comment in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Christian Geyer described the judgment 
as the ‘anatomy of a deception’.17 
Indeed, after this enlightening discussion of the decision-making processes, the Court’s silence 
concerning the issue itself comes across as deafening. Can we expect greater decisiveness? How 
difficult it is to fulfil such expectations can be taken from the decision of 7 September 2011 on aid for 
Greece.
18
 
Here, the Court reacted to the conflict between integration and democracy by reiterating legal 
principles the observance of which it then failed to guarantee: Budgetary powers, it said, are a core 
responsibility of the parliament; however, when assessing budgetary risks, there is a prerogative for 
which political responsibility is to be borne. It is true that ‘breakout’ legal instruments which disregard 
the treaties (‘ausbrechende’ Rechtsakte) do not apply in Germany; but that risk was contained by the 
fact that the economic and monetary union had, after all, been formulated to be consistent with the 
Basic Law. Last but not least: While in principle it is true that the government cannot elude its legal 
obligations with the help of international institutions, it remained unclear, whether or not legal 
protection has to be granted when European law is circumvented or transformed where the integration 
programme of the Union is ‘complemented’ by an intergovernmental treaty.19  
The Court was confronted with complaints by a group of 5 professors against the aid granted to 
Greece, and of Member of the Bundestag, Dr. Gauweiler, against the Euro Rescue Package. The 
procedural specifics of Federal Constitutional Court Act need not concern us here. However, the three 
substantive principles which the Court has established are certainly instructive – but so are the reasons 
which the Court has added to explain why it can and should refrain from intervening. 
                                                     
14
 Two special editions of legal journals deserve mention: the (2011) German Law Jounal, No. 10 with nine contributions 
and the (2009) 48 Der Staat, No. 4, 2009 with six contributions and former constitutional judge Dieter Grimm as the only 
author to show (some) understanding for the Court.  
15
 Decision of 19 June 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20120619_2bve000411.html press release in English at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-042en.html. 
16
 See note 7, Majone, note 10 above, Damian Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and the Need for a European 
Law of Struggle’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 67-693 and Christian Joerges/Maria Weimer, ‘A Crisis of Executive 
Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?’, forthcoming in Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds), 
Liber Amicorum for David M Trubek, Oxford: Hart Publishing, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2190362. 
17
 Christian Geyer, ‘Anatomie einer Hintergehung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 21.06.2012, p. 29 
18
 Decision of 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10 – 2 BvR 1485/10 – 2 BvR 1099/10, available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html. 
19
 In the recent judgment of 12 September 2012 on the ESM and Fiscal Compact,  (an – incomplete – translation is available 
at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html), the issue was addressed again. The court now 
cited the notion of ‘“völkerrechtliches Ersatzunionsrecht” (international law substituting European Union law)’ and 
observed that ‘no monitoring by the European Parliament is possible’ (para. 252).  
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The core argument concerns the budgetary power and responsibility of the Bundestag, clearly a 
constitutional essential because ‘the decision on public revenue and public expenditure is a 
fundamental part of the ability … to democratically shape itself’20 (47, para. 122). The Bundestag 
must ‘retain control of fundamental budgetary decisions even in a system of intergovernmental 
administration.’ However, the so the court contnues, ‘the FCT must restrict itself to manifest 
violations’ and must with regard to the risks incurred ‘respect a latitude of assessment of the 
legislature.’21 
Recalling the Maastricht Judgment and its warning that Germany will not comply with European 
legislative acts where the order of competences has not been respected (‘ausbrechende Rechtsakte’), 
the Court states bravely that ‘particular mention should be made of the prohibition of direct purchase 
of debt instruments of public institutions by the ECB, the prohibition of accepting liability (bail-out 
clause) and the stability criteria for sound budget management.’22 Somewhat surprisingly, the Court 
then explains that in the present case, a detailed examination necessitated even though it is ‘possible to 
derive’ from Articles 123-126 and 136 TFEU that these provisions pre-suppose the autonomy of 
national budgetary powers and that hence an ‘acceptance of liability for decisions of other Member 
States with financial effect which overstretches the basis of legitimation of the association of 
sovereign states (Staatenverbund) – by direct or indirect communtarisation of state debts - is to be 
avoided.’23  
Last but not least, the Basic Law protects Germany’s citizens against ‘a loss of substance of their 
power to rule by far-reaching … transfers of duties and powers of the Bundestag to supranational 
institutions’.24Such protection is not mandated, however, because the acts complained against here 
were ‘not sovereign acts of German state authority which may be challenged under the Federal 
Constitutional Court Act.
25
  
The recent judgment on the ‘European Stability Mechanism’ (ESM Treaty) and the ‘Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance on the Economic and Monetary Union’ (Fiscal Compact), 
which had been anticipated with so much suspense, is profoundly ambivalent.
26
 As was being reported 
in many quarters, a step towards democratising crisis policy had been accomplished because the rights 
of the Bundestag had been strengthened again. Indeed para. 274 reads: ‘By virtue of its approval of 
stability aids, the Bundestag exercises the influence demanded by the Constitution and is a participant 
in decisions on the amount, conditionality and length of stability aids. It therefore determines the most 
important conditions for future successful demands for capital disbursements under Article 9, Para. 2 
ESM Treaty’.27 But what about the budgetary rights of other parliaments in the Union? The 
conditionality, which the European Central Bank, too, would like to see guaranteed, is anything but 
democratic. Its approval is all the more confusing because the Court had previously, in the most 
positive passage of the decision, taken the requirement of the so-called eternity clause (Art. 79 Para. 3 
German Basic Law) to guarantee ‘structures and procedures which keep the democratic process open’. 
Would other alternatives have been possible and advisable? Should the Court have brought down aid 
                                                     
20
 Para.122. 
21
 Para. 130 
22
 Para. 129 
23
 Para. 129. 
24
 Para. 98, 
25
 Para. 116 
26
 See the reference in the previous note. In view of  the importance of para. 274, the German original is added here: ‘Da der 
Bundestag durch seine Zustimmung zu Stabilitätshilfen den verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen Einfluss ausüben und Höhe, 
Konditionalität und Dauer der Stabilitätshilfen zugunsten hilfesuchender Mitgliedstaaten mitbestimmen kann, legt er 
selbst die wichtigste Grundlage für später möglicherweise erfolgende Kapitalabrufe nach Art. 9 Abs. 2 ESMV’. 
27
 This is our translation. Pertinent passages in the extract translation can be found at para.s 125 ff.   
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for Greece and the European Stability Mechanism? This is not yet the crux of the matter. Just as the 
European Court of Justice cannot and must not control the entire structure of Europe’s constitution, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court cannot and must not presume such decision-making power. 
Joseph Weiler reproaching the German Court for acting like a dog that barks, but does not bite, or 
Perry Anderson’s caustic remark that the Court underlines democratic principles with one hand while 
signing off on their contemptuous treatment with the other sound elegant, but are too simplistic:
 28
 The 
actual problem is of a fundamental nature: Nobody is the guardian of Europe’s present constitutional 
constellation. 
In all this, the following becomes apparent: European crisis policy has acquired a toolbox with which 
it monitors the Member States with unparalleled intensity; Germany Europeanises its philosophy of 
austerity by placing conditions on financial transfers; decisions are exacted from the German Federal 
Constitutional Court that are critical to the survival of the European currency and the destiny of the 
global economy. All this is not the result of sinister conspiracies, but takes place because the dynamics 
of the crisis demand too much of the law and because the law with its restrictions has contributed to 
Europe’s policy failure. Not less than three former judges of the FCC expressed their dismay publicly. 
‘Does necessity abide by no laws?’, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde asked as early as 21 June 2010.29 ‘Is 
there no time for the law?’, Winfried Hassemer added in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in its 28 
June 2012 issue; Paul Kirchhof detects a ‘constitutional emergency’ in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 12 July 2012. Are we experiencing how Europe and its constitution are being put on trial? 
More dramatically, and in the form of an alternative: Is this a state of emergency when the time for a 
commissarial dictatorship has come? Or should we be in a position to understand the crisis as an 
opportunity for Europe to push forward its democratisation decisively? Carl Schmitt stands for the first 
alternative, Jürgen Habermas for the second. 
Carl Schmitt’s Shadow  
Carl Schmitt considered himself a situational thinker. For this reason, it would not be legitimate to 
read a diagnosis of Europe’s current situation into his writings. But his opus certainly does include a 
set of theorems that are astonishingly current. This applies not only to the state of emergency already 
mentioned above, but also to his notions from the early 1920s about a commissarial dictatorship linked 
to such a state of emergency and to his analyses from the mid-1930s of the decline of the separation of 
powers. In addition, it also applies to important elements of his theory of the Großraum, which he 
presented in a talk entitled ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für 
raumfremde Mächte’ at a conference of the Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer des Nationalsozialistischen 
Rechtswahrer-Bundes [Reich section of professors in the National Socialist Association of Lawyers] 
in Kiel in the spring of 1939.
30 
Schmitt argued that the de facto spatial order of Europe was no longer 
in line with the jus publicum europaeum, which had made the sovereign state its central concept, Now, 
a concrete ‘space’ had to become the conceptual basis for international law and ‘the new ordering 
concept for a new international law’ – that of the ‘Reich, with its Volk based, völkisch Großraum 
order’. Schmitt identified ‘a people that has proved itself capable of this task’, namely the German 
people, to be the ‘guarantor and guardian’ of the order of the Großraum. 
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The theory of the Großraum with its ‘German Monroe Doctrine’ suited Nazi policy. The lecture was 
Schmitt’s way of reasserting himself as a leading legal thinker. Yet Schmitt had based his concept of 
the Großraum not only on völkisch claims to leadership, but also on transformations dominated by 
technical, industrial, and economic developments. Thus, Schmitt outlined, however spuriously, an 
erosion of the territorial state as the harbinger of the adaptation of international law, the factual re-
structuring of international relations and the replacement of classical international law by norm 
systems which today would affirmatively be called ‘governance structures’ or, distanced and critically, 
‘authoritarian managerialism’. Schmitt underlined two phenomena in particular, namely, the economic 
inter-dependencies beyond state frontiers (Großraumwirtschaft) and the specific dynamics and the 
ruling functions of technology-driven developments (‘technicity’ [Technizität]). 
In light of the financial crisis and when dealing with it, we must take not only Schmitt’s hypotheses on 
nation-states’ loss of sovereignty and the de-legalisation of their relationships seriously. Just as 
relevant are his observations—broadly supported by comparative legal research—on the increase in 
the powers of the executive and the usurping of legislative powers by governments forcing through a 
‘ratio gubernativa’ with a ‘laws decreed and enforced by the government’.31 Schmitt explicitly linked 
up with the figure of the ‘open state of emergency’ in which ‘the practice of authorizations to make 
laws (legislative delegations) [is] of particular theoretical and practical relevance’. Is such a practice 
‘dictatorial’? Schmitt believed that this question is posed too simply. Legislative authority, ‘provided 
it is constitutional’, ‘always’ offered ‘a legal bridge, but it can both lead back to the earlier 
constitutional legality and away from it to an entirely new constitutional basis’.  
In a comment on Hans Peter Ipsen’s monumental 1972 work Gemeinschaftsrecht, Schmitt revealed his 
opinion of the ‘earlier constitutional legality’ of European law. He had been ‘beset by a deep sense of 
sorrow’ when reading the 1000-page tome. This type of law, which legalises a technocratic-functional 
administration of European associations, had no concept of a legitimate political project.
32 
Concerning 
monetary union, we could add that its legal constitution with the restriction of the European mandate 
to monetary policy and the concomitant  constraints of national powers was one cause of the crisis. 
Then, it seems we would have to proceed to ‘an entirely new constitutional basis’. How would we get 
there? Christoph Schönberger, who is intimately familiar with Schmitt and certainly not equating 
Schmittian notions of the political with more benevolent types of leadership, recently suggested that 
Germany should accept the role of Europe’s hegemonic power which has accrued to it de facto.33 In so 
doing, he did not point to Max Weber’s nation-state that was to pursue ‘our nation’s economic and 
political power interests’; he hoped instead for a ‘German statecraft’ bringing about order pudently. At 
the time, Max Weber did not believe that Germany’s political class was capable of this. Are the 
prospects better now? The practice of European crisis policy, which certainly reflects Germany’s 
influence, is seeking refuge in a technocratic model [Technizität] as described by Schmitt. One can 
find elements of a kind of economic managerialism with an authoritarian flavour; one should note  that 
is no longer bound by constitutional law and that would not conform with actionable criteria, in the 
economic and social recipes prescribed by this policy. Those who hold Germany’s ordoliberal legacy 
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accountable for Germany’s moves and non-moves should be aware that this ‘Ordnungspolitik’ is no 
longer anchored in law.
 34
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The Crisis as Opportunity according to Jürgen Habermas 
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas’s opus magnum on the ‘discourse theory of law and democracy’, 
was published the same year that the Treaty of Maastricht, which limited the EU Member States’ 
political autonomy to such a large extent, was concluded. The threat to his project was by no means 
lost on Habermas. Included in the volume is a piece analysing the tension at play in the relationship 
between social democracy as institutionalised in the nation-state on the one hand and the decision-
making processes organised at the European level on the other, a configuration which in Habermas 
view already then threatens the political autonomy of Europe’s citizens.35 Habermas responds to this 
threat by firmly taking sides, even in this first essay on Europe’s constitution: Europe’s integration, he 
writes, is a response to the failures of the nation-states, above all Germany. Integration not only 
derives its dignity from this legacy, but is at the same time a prerequisite for preserving the 
accomplishments of democratic constitutionalism and must be shaped accordingly. Since then, 
Habermas has retained this stance and intensely followed and supported the process of integration with 
growing passion as a political citizen and political theorist. In the process, he has not permitted himself 
to be distracted from his goal by setbacks such as the French referendum and the downgrading of the 
ambitions of the European Convention in the Lisbon Treaty, and has time and again linked his 
interventions to equally firm criticism of the democratic deficits of Europe’s constitution and its 
political elites.  
Prior to the current crisis, the citizen as well as the theorist permitted himself to be challenged – taking 
up this challenge in countless public interventions across Europe, systematically in his 2011 essay The 
Crisis of the European Union: A Response. ‘Post-democratic executive federalism’ is the term with 
which he qualifies and dismisses the handling of the crisis, confronting it with the demand for a 
‘sufficiently democratic mode of juridification’. The constructive core of his alternative is a proposal 
bringing Europe’s people together as citizens of their states and as citizens of the Union. There is no 
need for them to give up their nation-states with their democratic achievements. In their role as 
European citizens, they are not dependent on these states’ roles as intermediaries, but rather constitute 
the European polity as members of one of the Union’s citizenries. Habermas does not gloss over the 
circumstance that the orientations of the citizens of their individual states often conflict with those of 
the citizens of the Union.
36
 But he places his hopes on the fact that to the extent that the citizens of 
Europe become aware of their dual status, they will also realise that this process could generate 
solidarity and an identity spanning the national citizenries. Nor does he overlook that Europe’s 
political elites deal with the particularistic-egoistic orientations of their electors tactically. Yet he 
assumes that the crisis will force them to ‘rally the population behind a common European future’.  
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‘Unitas in Pluralitate’: A Plea for a More Modest Union  
Normatively speaking, deciding between authoritarian ‘post-democratic executive federalism’ and a 
Union furnished with new competencies and democratically legitimated is unproblematic. The 
question is only whether such a decision is on the agenda.  
The discussion about the European democratic deficit has been conducted with greater and greater 
intensity since the Maastricht Treaty twenty years ago precisely because of closer integration that was 
decided upon then. A dispute between Dieter Grimm and Jürgen Habermas in 1995 was one of its 
early moments of glory.
37
 Dieter Grimm had put forward the following and warned: The body of 
European treaties was neither an expression of self-determination on the part of a European society 
nor should or could it organise a pan-European constitution. Too many of the cultural, social and 
political prerequisites on which democratic polities depended were lacking. This diagnosis, Habermas 
countered, was correct, but it failed to respond to the erosion of the nation-states’ capacity to act and 
underestimated the democratic potential of the process of Europanisation. What mattered was to 
‘initiate in terms of constitutional law’ the communicative relationships that Grimm found lacking and 
that indeed had been realised only rudimentarily.  
The continuity of both adversaries’ lines of argument is remarkable – and just as remarkable is a 
common lacuna: in both contributions, the economy driving Europe in its state of crisis is non-
existent. Yet at the time, the legal constitution of monetary union was considered the core of the 
Maastricht Treaty, a jewel in the crown of the single market, which would lead to political union. The 
unfounded audacity of these notions can easily be reconstructed within the framework of Polanyi’s 
economic sociology discussed at the outset.  
It is true that the process of integration by no means simply ‘deregulated’ Europe’s economy. But it 
destroyed the interdependence between (nation-state) labour relations and the European economic 
constitution without reconstituting the European welfare-state traditions at European level. It 
undermined the manifold ways in which the economy is socially embedded in the Member States and 
institutionalised monetary union in a set of rules that had to operate in a social vacuum. Social 
disintegration, Polanyi claimed, would lead to crises and then trigger countermovements. The 
executive-governmental federalism with which Europe responds to its crises has nothing in common 
with the countermovements Polanyi imagined. They are rather to be found in the protests against the 
policies for dealing with the crisis. Jürgen Habermas, who indeed let Polanyi have his say in his 1996 
(English translation: 2001) collection of essays The Postnational Constellation, will hardly disagree.
 
In his construction of a decision situation, such insights seem to get lost – ironically, constitutional 
lawyer Grimm’s position is closer to Polanyi’s here, even if he does not deal explicitly with the 
economy.  
The management of the crisis by means of regulatory policy and the call for a democratic deepening of 
Europe have something in common that is apparently considered to be without alternative: the way out 
of the crisis is said to require ‘more Europe’. To what extent is such a way out in fact without 
alternative? Anyone who takes the trouble to study the crisis management procedures and the 
numerous recommendations made and rubber-stamped in the context of the European Semester will 
wonder:
38
 Is this the way to do justice to the fact that the socioeconomic differences in the expanded 
Union are precisely not smoothing out, at least not uniformly, but are deepening? Is this the way to 
correct the disintegrative effects of the neoliberal interventions in the Union’s capitalisms? If it is not 
possible to construct a uniform welfare-state model, is it then advisable to dismantle Europe’s welfare-
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state traditions altogether? If our goal is not to suppress Europeans’ painful memories, not to iron out 
the differences between their historical experiences, not to waste the wealth of their cultures, must not 
then tolerance determine the status of European citizens?  
These questions are rhetorical. They are directed towards the currently practiced centralist style of 
European governance, which must claim to have knowledge that does not exist. To take up once more 
what was said at the outset, they are directed against the notion that one could suspend or write off 
democracy entirely by enthusiastically disbursing money and imposing strict cutbacks. They find 
normative support in the felicitous ‘motto’ of the ill-fated 2003 Constitutional Treaty about Europe 
being ‘united in diversity’. They do not project a return to the nation-state, least of all to that of Max 
Weber, but aim for legally structured relationships of cooperation in a Europe that has to learn to deal 
in a civil way with the conflicts resulting from its diversity, but which may refrain from attempting to 
attain the status of a major power.
39
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